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INTRODUCTION
De gustibus non est disputandum. There is no accounting for taste.
At least when it comes to matters of expression, that is the rule en-
graved by the First Amendment on the American constitutional tradi-
tion.' For the public debate to be robust and uninhibited, speech
should be allowed to flow freely, on matters large and small, in words
wise or foolish, beautiful or distasteful. But the First Amendment, of
course, is not absolute; and a number of limitations on freedom of
expression have been devised to mediate a balance between individu-
al liberty and societal interest in orderly coexistence and government
administration.
Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act' prohibits registration of "scan-
dalous," "immoral," and "disparaging" trademarks on the Principal
Register.5 Federal registration carries a number of benefits not availa-
ble to unregistered trademarks.6 Trademarks are commercial speech;
and as a content-based restraint on speech, § 2(a) implicates the First
Amendment.7 Courts that have had an opportunity to address chal-
t BA 2000, Yerevan State University, Armenia; MA 2002, Yerevan State University;
MCLS 2002, American University of Armenia; JD Candidate 2008, The University of Chicago.
1 US Const Amend I.
2 See Cohen v California, 403 US 15,24-25 (1971):
To many, the immediate consequence of this freedom may often appear to be only verbal
tumult, discord, and even offensive utterance. These are, however, within established limits,
in truth necessary side effects of the broader enduring values which the process of open de-
bate permits us to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is, in
this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.
3 See Chaplinsky v New Hampshire, 315 US 568, 571-72 (1942) ("There are certain well-
defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have
never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem.").
4 An Act to Provide for the Registration and Protection of Trade-marks Used in Com-
merce, to Carry Out the Provisions of Certain International Conventions, and for Other Purpos-
es ("Lanham Act"), Pub L No 79-489, 60 Stat 427 (1946), codified as amended at 15 USC § 1051
et seq (2000).
5 15 USC § 1052.
6 See text accompanying notes 17-21.
7 See Part II.B.1.
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lenges to the constitutionality of § 2(a) have dismissed them without
adequate analysis!
This Comment discusses two critical issues that courts have ig-
nored in addressing the constitutionality of § 2(a). First, courts have
overlooked the relevance of the public forum doctrine to the question
of the constitutional validity of § 2(a). It is well established that con-
tent-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional. The case
of § 2(a) is peculiar, however, in that it imposes a restriction not on
speech in the private arena but on speech on public property, the Prin-
cipal Register. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court has applied
the "public forum doctrine" to distinguish between three types of public
fora with varying degrees of protection afforded to speech therein: tra-
ditional, designated (or limited), and nonpublic. In traditional public
fora available for the exchange of ideas, like streets, parks, and side-
walks, the government may exclude speech on the basis of its content
only if the exclusion is narrowly tailored and serves a compelling gov-
ernment interest." In designated public fora opened up by the govern-
ment for expressive activity, the same limitations on the government's
authority to restrict speech apply."
When a forum is not traditional and the government does not de-
signate it as a limited public forum for the exchange of ideas, it is a non-
public forum and speech on such property may be restrained if the re-
strictions are reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 2 The Principal Register
is a forum created and maintained by the federal government to confer
to registrants benefits not available for unregistered trademarks. Thus,
the Principal Register is the forum to which the speech at issue here
seeks access, and the type of the fornm that the Principal Register
represents will determine the level of scrutiny applied to § 2(a). Analyz-
ing the relevant factors informing this inquiry, this Comment demon-
strates that the Principal Register is a nonpublic forum.
Second, this Comment develops a framework for applying the
proper test when the public forum and the commercial speech doc-
trines intersect. Most of the Supreme Court's public forum jurispru-
dence involves core political speech, and the Court has left open the
question of which of the existing two tests should apply to regulations
8 See text accompanying notes 50-60.
9 R.A.V v St. Paul, 505 US 377, 382 (1992).
10 See Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators' Association, 460 US 37, 45
(1983), citing Carey v Brown, 447 US 455,461 (1980).
11 See Perry, 460 US at 46.
12 Id.
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of commercial speech on public property. This Comment argues that in
a nonpublic forum, restrictions on commercial speech should be ana-
lyzed under the forum test of reasonableness and viewpoint-neutrality.
In Part I, this Comment lays out the general framework of the
Lanham Act and the case law applying § 2(a). Part II discusses the First
Amendment concerns raised by § 2(a) but ignored by the courts. Part
III apphes the public forum doctrine to the Principal Register to de-
termine its public forum status. Part IV examines the proper level of
scrutiny for restrictions on commercial speech on public property. It is
not within the scope of this Comment to determine the ultimate valid-
ity of § 2(a) under the applicable standard.3 It is hoped, however, that
courts will use this framework to carry out their heretofore neglected
task of carefully assessing whether the modern trademark registration
system is consistent with the commands of the First Amendment.
I. THE LANHAM ACT § 2(A)
The Lanham Act governs federal trademark rights. The Act lays
out a comprehensive framework for obtaining federal rights in trade-
marks and for protection of trademark owners' rights against various
forms of infringement.
Federal registration does not create a trademark;" rather the use
of a symbol to identify and distinguish the source of a product makes
a trademark."l The Lanham Act's definition of a trademark does not
bear upon a mark's eligibility for registration and instead encapsulates
a functional theory of trademarks: "The term 'trademark' includes any
word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof... [used]
to identify and distinguish [one's] goods, including a unique product,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source
of the goods, even if that source is unknown.""6
Although registration is not required for a trademark to be valid,
federal registration provides the owner with an array of important
benefits that are not available to an unregistered mark.1 For instance:
(1) registration on the Principal Register is prima facie evidence of the
validity of the mark and of the registrant's ownership and exclusive
13 Commentators have suggested, with varying conclusions, a number of interests that the
government may assert as being advanced by § 2(a). See notes 211,213.
14 This Comment uses the terms "trademark" and "mark" interchangeably.
15 Application of Deister Concentrator Co, 289 F2d 496, 501 (CCPA 1961); Thomas J.
McCarthy, 3 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 19:3 at 18 (West 2007).
16 15 USC § 1127.
17 See McCarthy, 3 McCarthy § 19:9 at 30-32 (cited in note 15).
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right to use the mark; 8 (2) registration makes the mark "incontesta-
ble," serving as conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right
to use the mark, subject only to certain statutory defenses;'9 (3) regis-
tration provides constructive notice of a claim of ownership eliminat-
ing any defense of good faith adoption and use of the same mark
made after the date of the registration;'° and (4) registration allows
recovery of profits, damages, costs, treble damages, and attorneys' fees
in infringement litigation."
Section 2 of the Act determines registrability of trademarks through
a list of exclusionary criteria barring a mark's registration. The focus of
this Comment is on the prohibitions of § 2(a), which in pertinent part
provides that "[n]o trademark ... shall be refused registration on the
principal register on account of its nature unless it ... [c]onsists of or
comprises immoral, ... or scandalous matter; or matter which may
disparage ... persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national
symbols, or bring them into contempt or disrepute.""
What attributes make a mark "scandalous," "immoral," or "dispa-
raging" is not self-evident from the statute. The legislative history of
the Lanham Act is similarly unrevealing as to how the drafters in-
tended the terms to be interpreted. From the little that can be
18 15 USC §§ 1057(b), 1115(b).
19 15 USC §§ 1065,1115(b).
20 15 USC § 1072.
21 15USC§ 1117.
22 15 USC § 1052(a) (emphasis added). For purposes of linguistic efficiency and in accordance
with the common practice, marks that may "bring [the speeified protected groups] into contempt
or disrepute" will be referred to as "disparaging" marks. In addition, the case law does not con-
tain any distinctions between "scandalous" and "immoral" marks. See In re Mavety Media Group
Ltd, 1993 TTAB LEXIS 25, *1 n 2. Therefore, the ban on the registration of "immoral" and
"scandalous" trademarks will be treated as one of the two heads of the prohibitive framework of
§ 2(a), and the proscription on registration of "disparaging" marks as the other.
23 Upon receipt of an application to register a trademark, the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) refers it to an examining attorney for an ex parte examination of its registrability. 15 USC
§ 1062(a). If the mark is approved for registration, it is published in the PTO Official Gazette
with the registration itself typically issuing within six months. 37 CFR § 2.80 (2007). If the ex-
aminer finds the mark not registrable and issues a final rejection, an unsuccessful applicant may
appeal the examiner's decision to the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB). 15 USC
§ 1070. The Board's decision may then be appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit or, alternatively, the applicant may obtain de novo review at a United States
district court. 15 USC § 1071. Prior to October 1, 1982, appeals from TFAB lay before the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, which was subsequently merged into the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit. Under South Corp v United States, 690 F2d 1368,1369 (Fed Cir 1982) (en banc), the
decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals are binding on the Federal Circuit.
24 See Unfair Competition under Title IX of the Lanham Act, 51 Colum L Rev 1053,1053-54
n 8 (1951). See also In re McGinley, 660 F2d 481,485 (CCPA 1981) (noting "a paucity of legisla-
tive history" of § 2(a) in shedding light on the meaning of the term "scandalous").
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gleaned from the legislative history of the statute, it is apparent that the
motivating force behind the § 2(a) prohibitions was congressional sen-
sibility about the use of certain words and names as trademarks. While
the drafters objected to ABRAHAM LINCOLN GIN and GEORGE
WASHINGTON COFFEE, they did not offer any interpretive insights
as to how the prohibitions should be executed. The lack of legislative
guidance and the vagueness of words like "scandalous" and "immoral"
led to a judicial recognition that "determination that a mark is scandal-
ous is necessarily a highly subjective one."" This, in turn, has generated a
body of case law whose hallmark has been unpredictability7 A brief
listing of a few cases suffices to demonstrate the point.
In the context of the "scandalous" and "immoral" prong of § 2(a),
the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) refused registration
to the mark SENUSSI for cigarettes for scandalousness on the ground
that the teachings of the Senussi Muslim sect forbid cigarette use,
while the mark AMISH for cigars was allowed registration due to af-
fidavits attesting, among other things, to the fact that 75 percent of
Amish men smoked cigars or chewed tobacco. 29 Similarly, BUBBY
TRAP was not registrable as a mark for brassieres ° and QUEEN
MARY was scandalous when applied to women's underwear,3 while
the mark OLD GLORY CONDOM CORP depicting a condom deco-
rated with stars and stripes, known as "old glory, 3 2 and a design mark
for a penis size-increasing device featuring "a melancholy, unclothed
male figure ruefully contemplating an unseen portion of his genitalia,"3
were granted registration. The marks MADONNA" and MESSIAS5
were found to be scandalous for use upon wine and brandy, while
25 See Hearings before the Committee on Patents Subcommittee on Trade-marks, 76th
Cong, 1st Sess 19 (1939) (Thomas E. Robertson).
26 In re Hershey, 6 USPQ2d 1470,1471 (TTAB 1988).
27 For a list of trademarks denied or allowed registration under the "scandalous" and "dis-
paraging" rubrics, see Stephen R. Baird, Moral Intervention in the Trademark Arena: Banning the
Registration of Scandalous and Immoral Trademarks, 83 Trademark Rep 661,669-70 n 23 (1993).
28 See In re Reemtsma Cigaretenfabriken GmbH, 122 USPQ 339,339 (TTAB 1959).
29 See In re Waughtel, 138 USPQ 594, 595 (TTAB 1963) (distinguishing the case from
Reemtsma on the ground that the facts on record demonstrate that tobacco use is not offensive
to followers of the Amish religion).
30 See In re Runsdorf, 171 USPQ 443,443 (TI'AB 1971).
31 See Ex parte Martha Maid Manufacturing Co, 37 USPQ 156, 156 (Commr Pat 1938).
32 See In re Old Glory Condom Corp, 26 USPQ2d 1216,1220 (TI'AB 1993).
33 In re Thomas Laboratories Inc, 189 USPQ 50,52 (T TAB 1975).
34 See In re Riverbank Canning Co, 95 F2d 327,329 (CCPA 1938).
35 See In re Sociedade Agricola E. Comerical Dos Vinhos Messias, 159 USPQ 275, 276
(TTAB 1968) (rejecting the arguments that "messiah" has a more remote connection to Jesus
Christ than "madonna" to the Virgin Mary and that the word is "archaic").
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BADASS was found to be registrable as a mark for musical instru-
ments; 6 JACK-OFF was found to be scandalous while JACK OFF
JILL was not."
The jurisprudence surrounding trademarks deemed "disparaging"
has been similarly plagued with subjectivity and hard-to-explain dis-
tinctions. DOUGH-BOY was found to be disparaging to American
veterans of the World War I for use as a mark for antivenereal-disease
preparation," and a mark depicting the national symbol of the Soviet
Union with an "X" superimposed on it was refused registration be-
cause it would be disparaging to Soviet citizens.39 In contrast, JAP was
found not to be disparaging to people of Japanese ancestry,' and
REDSKINS was not disparaging to Native American Indians. " An
opposition claim that the mark BLACK TAIL for adult magazines
was disparaging to African-American women because the word TAIL
was perceived as a vulgar and derogatory reference to women as fe-
male sex objects was dismissed for failure of proof, 2 while a group of
women was allowed standing to oppose as disparaging the mark
ONLY A BREAST IN THE MOUTH IS BETITER THAN A LEG
IN THE HAND for restaurant services." It appears that the success of
a registration application for a trademark that may be characterized
as "scandalous," "immoral," or disparaging" turns more on the degree
of subjective political, religious, and moral sensibilities of the particu-
lar decisionmaker than on any objectively ascertainable criteria.
The proscriptions of § 2(a) are directed at the content of trade-
marks and, as content-based restraints on speech, raise concerns about
their conformity with the First Amendment. Despite the constitutional
36 See In re Leo Quan, Inc, 200 USPQ 370,371 (TTAB 1978) (accepting applicant's conten-
tion that the word was an acronym for "Bettencourt Acoustically Designed Audio Sound System").
37 See In re Boulevard Entertainment, Inc, 334 F3d 1336, 1343 (Fed Cir 2003) (reasoning
that JACK OFF JILL contains an implicit reference to a nursery rhyme involving Jack and Jill
which creates a double entendre missing from the simply vulgar mark JACK-OFF).
38 See Doughboy Industries, Inc v Reese Chemical Co, 88 USPQ 227, 228 (PTO 1951) (re-
jecting the application despite the applicant's past use of the mark on other products).
39 See In re Anti-communist World Freedom Congress, Inc, 161 USPQ 304, 305 (TTAB
1969) (holding that the mark was disparaging a national symbol of the USSR regardless of
whether it was intended to express opposition to the Communist Party).
40 See In re Condas SA, 188 USPQ 544,544 (TTAB 1975).
41 See Harjo v Pro-football, Inc, 284 F Supp 2d 96 (DDC 2003).
42 See Boswell v Mavety Media Group, Ltd, 52 USPQ2d 1600, 1609 (TTAB 1999) (noting
that the word "tail" could have many meanings and that the opponents of the trademark pre-
sented no evidence that its use in the mark was disparaging to the relevant groups).
43 See Bromberg v Carmel Self Service, Inc, 198 USPQ 176, 179 (TTAB 1978) (interpreting
the statute to mean that anyone opposing a mark's registration has standing to bring an action if
they believe the mark to be disparaging and that they would be damaged by it).
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disfavor of content-based restrictions, courts have not critically ex-
amined the First Amendment implications of § 2(a). Some scholarly
attention has been dedicated to the matter but those efforts have
failed to evaluate the constitutionality of § 2(a) through the lens of the
public forum doctrine, the proper analytical tool for examining restric-
tions on speech on government property.-
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The § 2(a) prohibition on registration of "scandalous," "immoral,"
and "disparaging" trademarks implicates the First Amendment. Trade-
marks are commercial speech" and § 2(a) discriminates between the
marks based on their content.6 Content-based restrictions are pre-
sumptively unconstitutional,47 but the case of § 2(a) is complicated by
the fact that it regulates speech on government property, the Principal
Register. Restrictions on speech on public property are subject to a
different set of rules. The correct analytical framework is supplied by
the "public forum" doctrine, which accords the government different
levels of authority to regulate speech on its property depending on the
type of the forum. ' Restrictions in traditional and designated public
fora are subject to strict scrutiny, while regulation of speech in a non-
public forum must only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral. 9 Oddly
enough, courts that have had an opportunity to examine the validity
of § 2(a) have failed even to consider these questions, dismissing the
First Amendment claims on the theory that § 2(a) does not bar the use
of the trademark as an unregistered mark.
44 See, for example, Llewellyn J. Gibbons, Semiotics of the Scandalous and the Immoral and
the Disparaging: Section 2(a) Trademark Law after Lawrence v. Texas, 9 Marq Intel Prop L Rev
187, 247 (2005) (limiting its analysis of the public forum question to an observation that
"[a]rguendo, the register of trademark is [ ] a public forum for the purpose of registering trade-
marks"); Justin G. Blankenship, Note, The Cancellation of Redskins as a Disparaging Trademark:
Is Federal Trademark Law an Appropriate Solution for Words That Offend?, 72 U Colo L Rev
415,438-46 (2001) (arguing that § 2(a) furthers a substantial governmental interest in preventing
racial unrest under the commercial speecb test as applied to the mark REDSKINS but failing to
address the public forum issue); Theodore H. Davis, Registration of Scandalous, Immoral and
Disparaging Matter under Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act: Can One Man's Vulgarity Be Another's
Registered Trademark?, 54 Ohio St L J 331, 364-71 (1993) (analyzing § 2(a) under the unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine); Baird, 83 Trademark Rep at 677-701 (cited in note 27) (offering a de-
tailed discussion of the constitutionality of § 2(a) but not addressing the public forum doctrine).
45 See text accompanying notes 64-68.
46 See text accompanying notes 69-82.
47 R.A. V v St. Paul, 505 US 377, 382 (1992).
48 See Part III.A.
49 See id.
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A. Constitutional Analysis (or Lack Thereof) of § 2(a) in Courts
Courts that have addressed constitutional challenges to § 2(a)
have determined that it does not violate the First Amendment. The
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re McGinley was pre-
sented with a challenge to the constitutionality of § 2(a)'s ban on reg-
istration of "scandalous" marks. Although the unsuccessful applicant-
plaintiff in In re McGinley challenged § 2(a) under the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the court proceeded to examine the
statute under the First Amendment.51 Summarily rejecting the claim,
the court tersely observed that "it is clear that the PTO's refusal to
register [an applicant's] mark does not affect his right to use it. No
conduct is proscribed, and no tangible form of expression is sup-
pressed. Consequently, appellant's First Amendment rights would not
be abridged by the refusal to register his mark. 52
Subsequent judicial analysis of § 2(a) has been equally cursory. In
In re Mavety Media Group," the court, quoting the passage above,
held that In re McGinley "forecloses [First Amendment] challenges to
[§ 2(a)] as unconstitutional on its face or as applied." In Ritchie v
Simpson," although the constitutional validity of § 2(a) was not before
the court, the majority responded to the dissent's First Amendment
concerns by observing that "the denial of federal registration of a mark
does not prohibit the use of that mark." 6 In Pro-football v Haro,"7 the
court cited In re McGinley for the no-use-is-barred proposition but
went on to invoke the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to resolve
the claim on nonconstitutional grounds In In re Boulevard Entertain-
ment,9 the court, citing In re McGinley and In re Mavety, rejected the
applicant's First Amendment argument because "[pirevious decisions of
this court and our predecessor court ... have rejected First Amendment
challenges to refusals to register marks under section [2(a)]. ''W
50 660 F2d 481 (CCPA 1981).
51 See id at 483-84.
52 Id at 484.
53 33 F3d 1367 (Fed Cir 1994).
54 Id at 1374.
55 170 F3d 1092 (Fed Cir 1999).
56 Id at 1099. But see id at 1103 n 1 (Newman dissenting) ("The [In re McGinley] ruling has
received much criticism.").
57 57 USPQ2d 1140 (DDC 2000).
58 See id at 1143 (denying judgment on the pleadings on the basis that the constitutional
claims were premature under the avoidance doctrine and because the laches claim required a
more complete record).
59 334 F3d 1336 (Fed Cir 2003).
60 Id at 1343.
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B. Inadequacy of In re McGinley and Its Progeny
As has been widely suggested by commentators, the dismissal of
First Amendment challenges to § 2(a) based on the applicants' una-
bridged right to use the unregistered mark entirely misses the point."
Ability to use the particular mark without registration has nothing to
do with and does not resolve the problem that the registration itself, as
a grant of a valuable government benefit, is premised upon regulation
of the trademark's content. A mark is refused registration because the
government finds its content improper. Thus, even though an applicant
may still use the mark as an unregistered trademark, denial of regis-
tration imposes a penalty for her particular choice of a mark solely
because of its content. "[T]he fact that no direct restraint or punish-
ment is imposed upon speech or assembly does not determine the free
speech question.... [I]ndirect 'discouragements' undoubtedly have the
same coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as
imprisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes."62 "[O]ne is not to have the
exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on
the plea that it may be exercised in some other place." In that light,
an applicant's ability to use a trademark cannot dispose of the ques-
tion of constitutionality of § 2(a).
1. Section 2(a) as a content-based restriction on speech.
Trademarks are commercial speech entitled to First Amendment
protection."' The nature and fundamental functions of trademarks
61 See, for example, Robert Wright, Today's Scandal Can Be Tomorrow's Vogue: Why Sec-
tion 2(a) of the Lanham Act Is Unconstitutionally Void for Vagueness, 48 Howard L J 659, 682
(2005) (noting with respect to In re McGinley's reasoning that "it is illogical to conclude that the
denial of federal registration does not have at least a de minimis impact on an applicant's First
Amendment rights"); Kimberly A. Pace, The Washington Redskins Case and the Doctrine of
Disparagement: How Politically Correct Must a Trademark Be?, 22 Pepperdine L Rev 7, 48
(1994) ("Blanket reliance on the CCPA decision in [In re McGinley] would be inappropriate
since that court glossed over the difficult constitutional challenges in a cursory manner, without
articulating any analysis for its decision."); Baird, 83 Trademark Rep at 686 (cited in note 27)
(describing the In re McGinley decision as being "without a reasoned and well articulated analy-
sis of the difficult underlying issues"). It is hard to explain the dearth of challenges to § 2(a) and
the courts' cavalier treatment of the constitutional concerns raised. One might only hazard a
guess that the dismissiveness was due to a combination of judicial inertia, disproportionate defe-
rence to a prior precedent by a specialized court, TfAB's lack of constitutional authority to
strike down statutes as a non-Article III tribunal, and the relative rarity of trademark owners
who would risk business losses by using an "offensive" trademark.
62 American Communications Association v Douds, 339 US 382,402 (1950).
63 Schneider v Irvington, 308 US 147,163 (1939).
64 See Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 748,770 (1976).
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qualify them as commercial speech. The primary function of trade-
marks is to identify and distinguish the source of a seller's goods by
signifying that they come from or are controlled by a single source
and are of a certain level of quality and value. Trademarks also serve
as a "prime instrument in advertising and selling goods" and as "the
most important element of commercial speech which is communicated
to consumers." By imparting a certain message to the world about the
subject it signifies, the communicative aspect of a trademark is central
to its purpose.
Commercial speech has been defined as speech that does "no
more than propose a commercial transaction., 61 The trademark's func-
tions of source identification, quality guarantee, and advertising all at
their bottom serve simply to propose a commercial transaction to con-
sumers-to get the potential consumers to buy the product bearing the
mark. The Supreme Court has also held that "the mere solicitation of
patronage implicit in a trade name" is "a form of commercial speech."
''
1
Although the case involved trade names and the Court has not taken
up the question of trademarks, the logic of treating trade names as
commercial speech should undoubtedly extend to trademarks be-
cause, like trademarks, trade names identify the source of and provide
information about the goods or services in question.
An important feature of the prohibition on registration of trade-
marks that are "scandalous," "immoral," or "disparaging" is that it op-
65 See Thomas J. McCarthy, 1 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 3:2 at 3-4
(West 2007) (outlining four functions served by trademarks: identifying a seller's goods; signify-
ing that all goods bearing the trademark come from a single source; signifying that all goods
bearing the trademark are of equal level of quality; and advertising the goods); David C. Wilkin-
son, The Community Trade Mark Regulation and Its Role in European Economic Integration, 80
Trademark Rep 107, 109-11 (1990) (suggesting that a trademark performs an origin identifica-
tion function, a quality guarantee function, and a publicity function); William M. Landes and
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:An Economic Perspective, 30 J L & Econ 265,268-70 (1987)
("The value of a trademark is the saving in search costs made possible by the information and
reputation that the trademark conveys or embodies about the brand (or the firm that produces
the brand).").
66 See McCarthy, 1 McCarthy § 3:2 at 3-4 (cited in note 65); Thomas J. McCarthy, 6 McCarthy
on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 31:139 at 222 (West 2007).
67 Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 762, quoting Pittsburgh Press Co v Human Relations Com-
mission, 413 US 376,385 (1973).
68 Friedman v Rogers, 440 US 1, 11 n 10 (1979). See also Thomas J. McCarthy, Compulsory
Licensing of a Trademark: Remedy or Penalty, 67 Trademark Rep 197,234 (1977):
It would appear that a company's trademark is the most important element of commercial
speech which is communicated to consumers. If commercial speech is protected under the
First Amendment to preserve a free marketplace of commercial messages and to contribute
to free competition, then a trademark is at the core of the First Amendment protection.
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erates as a content-based restraint on speech. Other content-neutral
prohibitions contained in § 2 bar marks that convey false- or mislead-
ing information' or marks that would undermine competition," and
thus do not raise First Amendment concerns. In contrast, § 2(a)'s
prohibition of marks that impart a message that is "scandalous," "im-
moral," or "disparaging" is a regulation of speech based on its content.
"[L]aws that by their terms distinguish favored speech from disfa-
vored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content
based."" A government interference with the "marketplace of ideas"
by favoring one message or particular content over another has been
traditionally viewed as problematic and goes to the heart of what the
69 See 15 USC § 1052(a) (prohibiting registration of marks that "falsely suggest a connec-
tion with persons, living or dead, institutions, beliefs, or national symbols" and of marks for wines
and spirits that carry a "geographical indication" of a place "other than the origin of the goods").
70 See 15 USC §§ 1052(b) (prohibiting marks comprising the flag, coat of arms, or insignia
of sovereign units), 1052(c) (prohibiting marks comprising a name, portrait, or signature of an
individual without his or her consent, or the name, portrait, or a signature of a deceased presi-
dent without the widow's consent), § 1052(d) (prohibiting marks which "so resembleo" existing
registered marks "as to be likely ... to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"),
1052(e)(1) (prohibiting marks which are "merely descriptive or merely deceptively misdescrip-
tive"), 1052(e)(2)-(3) (prohibiting marks which are "primarily geographically descriptive" or
"primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive"), 1052(e)(4) (prohibiting marks that are
primarily merely surnames).
71 See 15 USC §§ 1052(e)(5) (prohibiting "functional" marks), 1052(f) (prohibiting marks
which may cause dilution of an existing famous mark). The provisions cited in notes 69 and 70
likewise aim to preserve fair competition by protecting the good will of the trademark owner
and preventing free riding and consumer confusion; § 1052(e)(5) is different in that it is not
based on the mark's subject matter. Functionality is a key concept in trademark law barring
protection of designs that have such superior functional utility that competition would be hin-
dered if the owner is allowed to claim exclusive rights to it. See Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition § 17 at 172 (ALl 1995):
A design is functional ... if [it] affords benefits in the manufacturing, marketing, or use of
the good or services with which the design is used, apart from any benefits attributable to
the design's significance as an indication of source, that are important to effective competi-
tion by others and that are not practically available through the use of alternative designs.
72 False and misleading commercial speech is not entitled to First Amendment protection.
See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York, 447 US 557,
566 (1980).
73 Turner Broadcasting System, Inc v FCC, 512 US 622, 643 (1994). On the other hand,
content-neutral restrictions are those that "place no restrictions on ... either a particular view-
point or any subject matter that may be discussed." Hill v Colorado, 530 US 703, 723 (2000). See
also id at 737 (Souter concurring) ("[A] restriction is content based only if it is imposed because
of the content of the speech ... and not because of [the manner of] its delivery."); Burk v Augus-
ta-Richmond County, 365 F3d 1247, 1254 (11th Cir 2004) ("A content-neutral conduct regulation
applies equally to all, and not just to those with a particular message or subject matter in mind."),
citing Hill, 530 US at 723; Geoffrey R. Stone, et al, Constitutional Law 1291 (Aspen 5th ed 2005)
("Content-neutral restrictions limit expression without regard to its content. They turn neither
on their face nor as applied on the content or communicative impact of speech.").
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First Amendment protects." "If there is a bedrock principle underlying
the First Amendment, it is that the Government may not prohibit the
expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offen-
sive or disagreeable."" Moreover, while First Amendment doctrine on
commercial speech allows for some regulation of content, even com-
mercial speech, "however tasteless and excessive it sometimes may
seem,"" cannot be restrained for its mere offensiveness. 8 For this rea-
son, content-based restrictions on speech must be carefully scrutinized
to ensure that the government does not suppress or chill ideas it disa-
grees with. 9 In re McGinley and its progeny overlook § 2(a)'s obvious
tension with this principle: if the government is not allowed to ban
displays of fighting words that "insult, or provoke violence on the basis
of race, color, creed, religion, or gender"; " prerecorded dial-a-porn tele-
phone messages;" or motion picture displays in which "female breasts
and bare buttocks were shown"S'-undoubtedly unpalatable speech to
some -then the constitutional validity of a ban on registration of marks
like MADONNA or MESSIAS is in grave doubt.
2. The problem of government-provided benefits.
It has been suggested that "'[a]bridging' within the meaning of
the First Amendment may occur even if the law in question does not
by its terms either prohibit or punish speech."" Although registration
on the Principal Register is a privilege and not a right, the Court has
recognized that "to deny [a benefit to those] who engage in certain
forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech. Its deter-
rent effect is the same as if [they] were fine[d] ... for this speech."4 In
74 See R.A.V, 505 US at 382 ("The First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech ... because of disapproval of the ideas expressed."); Simon & Schuster v New
York State Crime Victims Board, 502 US 105, 116 (1991) ("[T]he government's ability to impose
content-based burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may effectively drive
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.").
75 Texas v Johnson, 491 US 397,414 (1989).
76 See text accompanying notes 190-93.
77 44 Liquormart, Inc v Rhode Island, 517 US 484,496 (1996).
78 Bolger v Young Drug Products Corp, 463 US 60, 71 (1983), quoting Carey v Population
Services International, 432 US 678 (1977).
79 See Police Department of Chicago v Mosley, 408 US 92,95-96,98-99 (1972).
80 See R.A.V, 505 US at 391-92.
81 See Sable Communications of California, Inc v FCC, 492 US 115, 126 (1989) (holding that
indecent but nonobscene speech is protected under the First Amendment).
82 See Erznoznik v Jacksonville, 422 US 205,209 (1975).
83 See Melville B. Nimmer, Nimmer on Freedom of Speech § 4.07 at 4-33 (Matthew
Bender 1984).
84 Speiser v Randall, 357 US 513,518 (1958).
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Speiser v Randall," the Court held that "a discriminatory denial of a
tax exemption for engaging in speech is a limitation on free speech." 6
Simply because what is denied is a "privilege," it does not follow that
"its denial may not infringe speech."' Similarly, in Perry v Sinder-
mann," the Court held that a state college may have violated a teach-
er's First Amendment rights by refusing to renew his contract-the
employee's lack of a contractual or tenure right to re-employment not-
withstanding-when the basis of the nonrenewal was the employee's
public criticism of his superiors on matters of public concern:
[E]ven though a person has no "right" to a valuable governmen-
tal benefit and even though the government may deny him the
benefit for any number of reasons ... [i]t may not deny a benefit
to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally protected
interests -especially, his interest in freedom of speech.9
Section 2(a) operates precisely in this manner.
Neither is § 2(a) a case of a selective nonsubsidy of government
benefits. The First Amendment distinguishes between the govern-
ment's right not to subsidize speech that falls outside or distorts its
own programs and imposing a penalty for the exercise of one's rights in
free speech. The former is permissible; the latter is not. The prohibition
of § 2(a) is more like a penalty than a selective nonsubsidy of speech.
The Court addressed the distinction between "penalty" and "non-
subsidy" in Rust v Sullivan." Rust involved a challenge to Department
of Health and Human Services regulations limiting "the ability of
Title X fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities," includ-
ing provision of information about abortion services.' In upholding
the regulations against a First Amendment challenge, the Court held:
The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selec-
tively fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to
be in the public interest, without at the same time funding an al-
ternative program which seeks to deal with the problem in
another way... A refusal to fund protected activity, without
85 357 US 513 (1958).
86 Id at 529 (reversing the denial of property tax exemptions to war veterans for their
refusal to execute a loyalty oath).
87 Idat518.
88 408 US 593 (1972).
89 See id at 596-97 (explaining that to allow the government to deny benefits based on
constitutionally protected activity would impermissibly penalize that activity).
90 500 US 173 (1991).
91 Id at 177-78.
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more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a "penalty" on
that activity. There is a basic difference between direct state in-
terference with a protected activity and state encouragement of
an alternative activity consonant with legislative policy.9
The Court went on to explain that "when the Government ap-
propriates public funds to establish a program it is entitled to define
the limits of that program."" One might argue that § 2(a) involves just
such a situation: in setting up the Principal Register, the government
has established its own program and has defined its limits in a way
that excludes offensive matter. The analogy, however, is false. The
Court elaborated on the meaning of Rust in subsequent cases. In Ro-
senberger v Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, " the Court
clarified that the government is permitted to "regulate the content of
what is or is not expressed [with its subsidy] when it is the speaker or
when it enlists private entities to convey its own message."95 By estab-
lishing the Principal Register, the government neither speaks nor enl-
ists private parties to convey the government's message. Trademarks
carry the owner's message, not the federal government's. The Principal
Register is not the government's policy statement but a medium
through which private expressive activity is channeled.9 As the Court
later observed, "Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a
mere definition of its program in every case, lest the First Amendment
be reduced to a simple semantic exercise."" Rather than being a discre-
tionary nonprovision of the benefit of registration, cast as a parameter
of the federal "trademark program," § 2(a) acts as a penalty on the
92 Id at 193 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
93 idat 194.
94 515 US 819 (1995).
95 Id at 833-34 (emphasis added).
96 Compare Legal Services Corp v Velazquez, 531 US 533, 542 (2001) (holding that legal
representation of indigent clients by attorneys funded by Congress was private speech because
such a "lawyer speaks on behalf of his or her private ... client" and "represents the interests of
indigent clients"), and Rosenberger, 515 US at 834-35 (observing that the "distinction between
the [public] University's own favored message and the private speech of students [eligible for
University Student Activities Fund support] is evident" because the students "are not the Uni-
versity's agents, are not subject to its control, and are not its responsibility"), with Rust, 500 US at
193 (holding that the challenged regulations "are designed to ensure that the limits of the federal
program ... to encourage family planning" were observed). See also Velazquez, 531 US at 542
(distinguishing Rust and clarifying that "[tihe Court in Rust did not place explicit reliance on the
rationale that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X amounted to governmental
speech"); Rosenberger, 515 US at 833 (explaining that in Rust "the government did not create a
program to encourage private speech but instead used private speakers to transmit specific
information pertaining to its own program").
97 Velazquez, 531 US at 547.
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exercise of a private right to freedom of speech.8 In re McGinley-type
reasoning fails even to acknowledge this difficulty.
3. Unconstitutional burdens on speech.
Disadvantaging the exercise of free speech rights is no less of-
fensive to the First Amendment than direct government regulation. In
Simon & Schuster v Members of New York State Crime Victims Board,9
the Court unanimously rejected the proposition that the government
may financially burden speech on the basis of its content.O At issue in
Simon & Schuster was New York's so-called "Son of Sam" law, which
required the income of a convicted or accused criminal from publica-
tion of books describing his or her crime(s) to be placed into a special
escrow account that would then be used to satisfy civil judgments
against the criminal for the victim(s)."' Finding the law to be "plainly
impos[ing] a financial disincentive only on speech of a particular con-
tent" -speech about the crimes of the author-the Court applied
strict scrutiny to invalidate it.'O The Court reiterated that "[a] statute is
presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes a
financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech"
and reasoned that "[t]he government's ability to impose content-based
burdens on speech raises the specter that the government may effec-
tively drive certain ideas and viewpoints from the marketplace."' '
Section 2(a)'s content-based ban does not impose a direct finan-
cial burden such as that discussed in Simon & Schuster. But in light of
the multiple benefits of federal registration, the ban limits a trade-
mark owner's ability to protect her trademark to the fullest extent
available to registered trademarks and thereby chills her freedom of
expression. Federal registration benefits such as nationwide notice and
prima facie evidence of incontestability of the trademark help to avoid
litigation and make protection against infringement cheaper. ' Section
98 The Court has struck down similar penalties on private expression. See, for example,
Rutan v Republican Party, 497 US 62,71 (1990) ("Conditioning continued public employment on
an employee's having obtained support from a particular political party violates the First Amend-
ment because of the coercion of belief that necessarily flows from the knowledge that one must
have a sponsor in the dominant party in order to retain one's job.") (quotation marks and citation
omitted); Wieman v Updegraff, 344 US 183,190-91 (1952) (rejecting the conditioning of compensa-
tion on a loyalty oath as imposing penalties for engaging in First Amendment activities).
99 502 US 105 (1991).
100 See id at 123. See also Rosenberger, 515 US at 828.
101 See Simon & Schuster, 502 US at 108.
102 Id at 116.
103 Id at 115-16 (citation omitted).
104 See text accompanying notes 17-21.
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2(a) thus provides a financial disincentive against use of marks that may
be found to be "scandalous," "immoral," or "disparaging."
4. The ban on registration of "disparaging" trademarks as a
viewpoint-based restraint.
Although In re McGinley did not involve a "disparaging" mark,
its reasoning overlooks the fact that the ban on registration of "dispa-
raging" marks raises special concerns as a viewpoint-based restraint.
The line between content-based restrictions and viewpoint restric-
tions, which are a subclass of the former, is often hard to discern.""5 The
Court has not offered clear guidance as to when a restriction crosses
the line from a purely content-based restraint and ventures into the
realm of viewpoint discrimination.1" In a simplified characterization, a
viewpoint restraint is one that allows one view on a certain subject but
disallows another. For instance, a law allowing praise of the Iraq War
but not criticism of it would be viewpoint-based, while a law that
would ban the discussion of the War altogether would be content-
based. In that light, § 2(a)'s singling out of "disparaging" marks is a
viewpoint-based regulation because it allows registration for marks
that glorify, praise, or promote "persons, . .. institutions, beliefs, or na-
tional symbols" but not for marks that take the opposite view. Thus, a
trademark DOWN WITH THE KKK might be ineligible for registra-
tion while a mark LONG LIVE HEZBOLLAH might be registrable,




Viewpoint-based restrictions are presumptively unconstitutional.1°
These restrictions are particularly disfavored due to their tendency to
distort the marketplace of ideas. 9 By restricting or excising from dis-
course a particular viewpoint, viewpoint-based restraints disadvantage
only one side of the public debate and thus inhibit a full exposition of
ideas.11 "[Tihe First Amendment forbids the government to regulate
105 See Rosenberger, 515 US at 829 (explaining that viewpoint discrimination is an "egre-
gious form of content discrimination").
106 See id at 831 (acknowledging that the distinction between content-based and viewpoint
discrimination "is not a precise one").
107 See, for example, R.A.V, 505 US at 391-92 (invalidating an ordinance proscribing fight-
ing words on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender because it would allow one to
"hold up a sign saying ... that all 'anti-Catholic bigots' are misbegotten; but not that all 'papists'
are, for that would insult and provoke violence 'on the basis of religion').
108 Rosenberger, 515 US at 830.
109 See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm &
Mary L Rev 189 (1983) (discussing the special concerns raised by viewpoint-based restrictions).
110 See id at 197-200.
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speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of
others."'. Moreover, viewpoint-based restraints are impermissible in
any type of forum under the arguably more pro-regulation public fo-
rum doctrine."2 Simply rejecting a First Amendment attack on § 2(a)
because the statute does not bar the use of the rejected trademark ig-
nores the fact that, at least with respect to "disparaging" marks, § 2(a)
imposes a constitutionally invalid restriction based on viewpoint.
III. THE PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE
The constitutional analysis of § 2(a) is peculiar in that under the
Lanham Act framework, a trademark is speech that seeks access to
government property, the Principal Register. This is a critical distinc-
tion because regulation of speech on government property is subject
to a different framework of rules than purely private speech. While
the inscription "Fuck the Draft" on a jacket is protected expression,"3
it is nearly inconceivable that the First Amendment must protect the
"right" to scribble the same phrase on the wall in the lobby of the
Pentagon. Recognizing the need to allow the government, as a proper-
ty owner, to control access to its property and to preserve its purpos-
es,"' the Court has created the public forum doctrine to assess the con-
stitutionality of regulations of speech on government property."5 The
doctrine distinguishes between three types of government property -a
111 Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 US
789,804 (1984).
112 See Part III.A. See also Perry Education, 460 US at 57 (Brennan dissenting) ("[Tihe
Court disregards the First Amendment's central proscription against viewpoint discrimination, in
any forum, public or nonpublic."). Viewpoint-discriminatory regulations were upheld in Rust,
because the regulations involved discretionary funding of the government's own program. But as
the Court explained in striking down viewpoint-based denials of government benefits, "view-
point-based restrictions are improper when the government does not itself speak or subsidize
transmittal of a message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views
from private speakers." Velazquez, 541 US at 542. In the context of § 2(a), the government nei-
ther speaks itself nor subsidizes its own message through private speakers. See Part II.B.2.
113 Cohen v California, 403 US 15,26 (1971).
114 See Greer v Spock, 424 US 828, 836 (1976) (upholding a regulation banning the distribu-
tion of political material on a military base because the government, "no less than a private
owner of property, has power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is
lawfully dedicated"); Adderley v Florida, 385 US 39, 48 (1966) (affirming the conviction of a
group of protestors for trespass onto jail property because the First Amendment guarantees do
not mean "that people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to
do so whenever and however and wherever they please").
115 For the history and evolution of the public forum doctrine, see generally Robert C. Post,
Between Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L
Rev 1713 (1987); Daniel A. Farber and John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 Va L Rev 1219 (1984).
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traditional or quintessential public forum, a designated or limited pub-
lic forum, and a nonpublic forum. The type of the forum determines
the level of scrutiny applied to the regulation.
A. The Doctrine
The public forum doctrine divides government property into three
distinct types of fora. The "traditional" or "quintessential" public forum
is "defined by the objective characteristics of the property, such as
whether, 'by long tradition or by government fiat,' the property has been
'devoted to assembly and debate."' 16 These fora-streets, parks, and si-
dewalks-have "immemorially been held in trust for the use of the pub-
lic" and are open for expressive activity regardless of the government's
intent."7 The government may impose a content-based exclusion in
these fora only upon a showing of a compelling government interest
and only if the exclusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.'
8
The second category is the "designated" or "limited" public fo-
rum, property that the government "has opened for use by the public
as a place for expressive activity""' 9 by part '20 or all of the public. That
is, in contrast to traditional public fora, "designated public fora ... are
created by purposeful governmental action.' 2' The government intent
to open up such a forum is critical. Although the government is not
required to open up such a forum, once it does so, it is bound by the
same rules that govern the traditional public forum.
'1
116 Arkansas Education Television Commission v Forbes, 523 US 666, 667 (1998), citing
Perry Education Association v Perry Local Educators'Association, 460 US 37,45 (1983).
117 Perry Education, 460 US at 45, citing Hague v CIO, 307 US 496, 515 (1939). See also
United States v Grace, 461 US 171 (1983) (holding that public sidewalks are traditional public
fora and therefore an ordinance could not prohibit distribution of literature on the sidewalk
outside the Supreme Court).
118 Perry Education, 460 US at 45. The government may also enforce narrowly tailored,
content-neutral regulations pertaining to the time, place, and manner of expression in a public
forum if they "serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative chan-
nels of communication." Id (citations omitted). See also Ward v Rock against Racism, 491 US
781,803 (1989) (applying this principle to a city's sound-amplification guidelines). This principle,
however, does not apply to § 2(a)'s content-based restrictions.
119 Perry Education, 460 US at 45.
120 See id at 46 n 7 ("A public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by
certain groups [such as student groups], or for the discussion of certain subjects [such as school
board business]."). Hence, the designation of the forum as a "limited" public forum.
121 Forbes, 523 US at 677.
122 See Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense & Educational Fund, Inc, 473 US 788,802 (1985)
("The government does not create a public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse,
but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional forum for public discourse.").
123 Perry Education, 460 US at 46.
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Finally, all the remaining public property is a nonpublic forum.
The government may restrict access to such fora if the regulation of
speech is reasonable and "not an effort to suppress expression merely
because public officials oppose the speaker's view."'"
B. The Principal Register as a Forum
As a source of federal trademark rights, the Register is the rele-
vant forum for free speech scrutiny. That the grant of access to the
governmental property is accompanied by expression in private fora
does not change the locus of the public forum inquiry. Even though
trademarks perform their core functions in the private marketplace,
the Register itself is the forum where the rights of the speaker are
asserted, defined, and conveyed to the rest of the world. In the ana-
logous context of a thoroughbred naming registry, the Sixth Circuit in
Redmond v The Jockey Club'2 applied the public forum doctrine to
determine the constitutionality of the Club's refusal to register the
plaintiff's horse under the name SALLY HEMINGS. ' The thorough-
bred could have enjoyed a fine racing career regardless of its name.
But the additional benefits of participating in certain races were avail-
able only upon the registration of the horse, so the registry was the
proper subject of the public forum analysis. As in Redmond, a trade-
mark owner's ability to obtain registration determines her access to
benefits that stem from federal registration.'
In framing its vision of the public forum doctrine, the Court has
differentiated between the government's actions as a proprietor and
as a regulator.9' This apparent dichotomy between the government's
role as a "proprietor" and a "lawmaker" might be misunderstood to
suggest that the government cannot act as a regulator when it is acting
as a proprietor and that, consequently, when it is acting as a regulator,
the public forum doctrine does not apply. Yet, the government's exer-
cise of one of these roles does not preclude the other. When the Court
applied the public forum doctrine in cases like International Society
124 Id.
125 244 Fed Appx 663 (6th Cir 2007).
126 See id at 668 (explaining that the registry was a limited public forum). The court as-
sumed that the Club, acting under the grant of authority from the Kentucky Horse Racing au-
thority, was a state actor.
127 See text accompanying notes 17-21.
128 See International Society for Krishna Consciousness v Lee, 505 US 672, 678 (1992)
("Where the government is acting as a proprietor, managing its internal operations, rather than
acting as lawmaker with the power to regulate or license, its action will not be subjected to the
heightened review to which its actions as a lawmaker may be subject.").
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for Krishna Consciousness v Lee,'9 Cornelius v NAACP Legal Defense
& Educational Fund, Inc,'3o and Perry Education Association v Perry
Locals Educators'Association,' the fact that the government was act-
ing as a proprietor did not detract from the fact that it was also acting
as a lawmaker regulating the operation of airport terminals, charity
drives in a federal workplace, and management-labor relations in a
school district. ' Similarly, while § 2(a) regulates the federal registra-
tion of trademarks, the regulation does not negate the fact that the
government is simultaneously acting as a proprietor controlling access
to its forum. The proper meaning of the proprietor/regulator distinc-
tion, therefore, should be understood to emphasize the public forum
doctrine's threshold distinction between the government's authority to
restrict speech on its property and its authority to do so with respect
to all other speech."'
In that light, § 2(a) calls for a public forum analysis. The Principal
Register is federal property that provides a distinct source of rights,"4
and the PTO acts as a gatekeeper to screen access in dispensing these
rights. It is true that the Register is not the kind of property that has
"internal operations" that need to be "manag[ed]..".. The access criteria
to the Register are what defines the Register itself, and there are no
other internal operations beyond the registration parameters. This
truism, however, does not undermine the proprietary character of the
Principal Register. What distinguishes § 2(a) from the government's
nonproprietary, regulatory endeavors is that in addition to regulating
economic rights, § 2(a) defines them in terms of access to a govern-
mental forum; and it does so in a way that turns on the content of ex-
pression seeking entry to the forum. In other words, the government
acts as a proprietor controlling the "quality" of the discourse in a fo-
rum of its creation.
129 505 US 672 (1992).
130 473 US 788 (1985).
131 460 US 37 (1983).
132 See id at 681 ("The practices of privately held transportation centers do not bear on the
government's regulatory authority over a publicly owned airport"); Cornelius, 473 US at 805-406
(noting the government's interest, as an employer, in regulating the federal workplace); Perry
Education, 460 US at 47-48 (discussing the school district's authority to preserve the interschool
mail system for school-related business).
133 See text accompanying notes 113-24.
134 See text accompanying notes 17-21.
135 Lee, 505 US at 678.
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The Court has also recognized that the "metaphysical" nature of
the forum is no bar to the application of the public forum doctrine."
Rather than being limited to physical property, the doctrine is con-
cerned with access to particular channels of communication. For in-
stance, the Court applied the public forum doctrine to "metaphysical"
fora like the university student activity fund in Rosenberger,3' to the
federal employee charity drive in Cornelius,' u and to the interschool
mail system in Perry Education."' As in these cases, the government
property to which trademarks seek access-the Principal Register-
functions as a forum where elements of speech are accommodated.
Finally, it is the Principal Register itself and not the entire trade-
mark system that is the relevant forum for purposes of the doctrine. In
Cornelius, the relevant forum was not the entire federal workplace but
the Combined Federal Campaign fund (CFC);* and in Forbes the re-
levant forum was the political candidate debate and not the full
broadcast program of the television station."' This is so because in de-
termining the scope of the forum, the focus is "on the access sought by
the speaker..... Accordingly, the relevant forum here is the Principal
Register because it is the particular medium to which trademark own-
ers seek access. One cannot apply for registration without owning a va-
lid trademark in the first place. Necessarily, then, the forum to which an
applicant seeks access is not the trademark system in general but the
forum of the Principal Register. This point further demonstrates the
inadequacy of In re McGinley's reasoning: the public forum doctrine
would be rendered meaningless if restrictions on speech on government
property could be simply brushed aside by a reference to the individu-
al's ability to exercise his First Amendment rights elsewhere.
C. The Public Forum Doctrine in Application
As discussed above, the nature of the forum determines the level
of scrutiny of the regulation. Content-based regulations in a tradition-
al or designated forum are subject to strict scrutiny, while the same
regulations in a nonpublic forum are reviewed only for reasonableness
136 See Rosenberger, 515 US at 830 ("The [Student Activity Fund] is a forum more in a
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.").
137 See id at 830.
138 See 473 US at 800.
139 See 460 US at 45.
140 See 473 US at 801.
141 See 523 US at 675.
142 Cornelius, 473 US at 801, citing Greer, 424 US at 836; Perry Education, 460 US at 45. See
also generally Lehman v City of Shaker Heights, 418 US 298 (1974).
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and viewpoint-neutrality. It is clear that the Principal Register is not a
traditional forum, as it is neither a public street nor a park or side-
walk. ' As will be demonstrated below, the Principal Register is not a
designated forum either but rather a nonpublic forum.
The government does not create a public forum "by inaction or
by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a
nontraditional forum for public discourse."" Government intent is
therefore critical to this assessment. To ascertain such intent, the Court
looks to the "policy and practice" of opening the forum for "indiscri-
minate use.' '.5 This includes consideration of whether the government
has made its property "generally available" or whether, instead, it in-
stituted a "selective access" regime to its forum. The government
does not create a designated forum when it restricts access through a
system of selective, individualized permissions for members of a cer-
tain category of speakers.17 Thus, a public forum does not exist when
the government makes "individual, non-ministerial judgments" as to
whether to grant access to the forum." On the other hand, the gov-
ernment creates a designated forum when it makes a forum broadly
available to the general public or to a class of speakers.
149
The analysis also focuses on the "nature of the property and its
compatibility with expressive activity.' When the nature or purpose
of the governmental forum is inconsistent with a broad exercise of
free speech rights by the general public, there is no public forumY"
"The mere fact that an instrumentality is used for the communication
of ideas does not make a public forum."' Finally, the fact that the
government uses the property for commercial purposes indicates that
there is no limited forum."' The idea is that when the government en-
143 See Perry Education, 460 US at 45.
144 Cornelius, 473 US at 802.
145 Perry Education, 460 US at 47 (explaining that a designated public forum would be
created if the mail system were open to the general public, but that the school district's limita-
tions on its use meant that it was a nonpublic forum).
146 Forbes, 523 US at 678-79.
147 Id at 679.
148 Id at 680 (explaining that the government did not create such a forum with the CFC in
Cornelius).
149 Id at 679.
150 Cornelius, 473 US at 802.
151 See text accompanying notes 171-82.
152 Perry Education, 460 US at 49 n 9.
153 See Lee, 505 US at 682 (reasoning that because an airport serves a primarily commercial
purpose, it "cannot fairly be said that an airport terminal has as a principal purpose promoting
'the free exchange of ideas"'), citing Cornelius,473 US at 800. See also Lehman, 418 US at 303:
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gages in commerce, it is entitled to make reasonable choices as to the
sort of speech it entertains on its property.
1. The Principal Register-the government's "policy" and "prac-
tice" in opening it up.
In assessing the government's "policy and practice" in opening up
and maintaining the forum, the Court considers whether the govern-
ment has made its property "generally available" for "indiscriminate
use by the general public," or, to the contrary, only allows "selective
access...... The text of § 2(a) and the legislative history of the Lanham
Act provide some insight into congressional intent in setting up the
Act's registration framework. One has to bear in mind the caveat that
when it comes to the question of opening up a designated public fo-
rum, legislative history may be an indirect guide at best because the
drafters almost certainly were not thinking in terms of "public fora" or
"opening up the governmental property to expressive activity.. 5
The text of § 2(a) suggests that the registration system leans more
towards inclusion rather than exclusion. The logical structure of the
statutory language commands the PTO to register all trademarks un-
less they fall into certain enumerated categories: "No trademark ...
shall be refused registration on the principal register on account of its
nature unless it (a) Consists of or comprises immoral, ... scandalous,
... or [disparaging] matter.'' "" This language suggests that trademarks
are presumptively registrable unless they fall under one of the speci-
fied prohibitions.
The legislative history of the Act invites construction in the same
vein. The statements of the drafters reveal that "[t]he purpose of this
bill is to simplify and make registration more liberal, to dispense with
mere technical prohibitions and arbitrary provisions, to make proce-
dure simple and inexpensive, and relief against infringement prompt
In much the same way that a newspaper or periodical, or even a radio or television station,
need not accept every proffer of advertising from the general public, a city transit system
has discretion to develop and make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising
that may be displayed in its vehicles.
154 Forbes, 523 US at 678-79; Perry Education, 460 US at 47.
155 The drafters would not have had reason to consider the constitutional implications of
§ 2(a) when enacting it in 1946. "Public forum" as a term of art was first employed by the Court
in 1972. See Mosley, 408 US at 95-96 (introducing the concept by reference to First Amendment
and equal protection concerns about government discrimination against speech based on its
content).
156 15 USC § 1052.
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and effective." 17 This stated objective of simplifying and liberalizing
the registration process evinces government intent to allow for a
broader access to the Principal Register.
The practice of TTAB and the courts has also reflected the inclu-
sive posture of the Act. In In re Old Glory Condom Corp,"" TTAB
noted that "the registration scheme of the Trademark Act is one more
inclined to inclusion than exclusion. 159 The same understanding may be
gleaned from the TTAB and judicial practice of resolving doubts in
favor of the applicant."
These indications in favor of the inclusiveness of the Principal Reg-
ister cannot be conclusive, however. In considering the "policy and prac-
tice" of the enforcement of § 2(a), one should not overlook the fact that
§ 2 in its totality does not provide a forum "for indiscriminate use." Sec-
tion 2 is not limited to the prohibitions of its subsection (a) but rather
contains numerous exclusionary criteria, which if present disqualify a
mark from registration.'61 Thus, although the registration system may be
inclined towards inclusion, that stance itself does not eliminate the se-
lective nature of the registration mechanism, much less transform the
Register into one available for "general access." The question is then
what truly constitutes "general access" by the public at large or by a
specific group as opposed to a system of selective inclusion.
a) General access versus selective access. The distinction between
"general access" and "selective access" has been critical in a number
of public forum cases. The Court has described the selective/general
access distinction in the following terms:
A designated forum is not created when the government allows
selective access for individual speakers rather than general access
for a class of speakers.
On the one hand, the government creates a designated public fo-
rum when it makes its property generally available to a certain
157 Bill Providing for the Registration of Trade-marks Used in Commerce, to Carry Out the
Provisions of Certain International Conventions, and for Other Purposes, HR Rep No 76-944,
76th Cong, 1st Sess 2 (1939) (Fritz Lanham) (emphasis added).
158 26 USPQ2d 1216 (TTAB 1993).
159 Id at 1219 n 3.
160 See, for example, In re In over Our Heads Inc, 16 USPQ2d 1653, 1654 n 1 (TTAB 1990)
("Because the guidelines are somewhat vague and because the determination is so highly subjec-
tive, we are inclined to resolve doubts on the issue of whether a mark is scandalous or disparag-
ing in favor of applicant.").
161 See 15 USC § 1052 (a)-(f). See also notes 69-71.
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class of speakers, as the university made its facilities generally
available to student groups in Widmar. On the other hand, the
government does not create a designated public forum when it
does no more than reserve eligibility for access to the forum to a
particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as indi-
viduals, obtain permission to use it.
In Widmar v Vincent,'63 a public university was found to have
created a limited public forum for registered student organizations by
implementing a policy that made its meeting facilities "generally
open" to such organizations.64 On the other hand, in Perry Education,
which involved claims of access to a school district's internal mail sys-
tem by rival teacher organizations, the Court held that the internal
mail system was not a limited public forum because the school district
had not "opened its mail system for indiscriminate use by the general
public" or for "entities of similar character" to those that were admit-
ted. Instead, it had reserved the mail system exclusively for a select
teachers' union. '65 The Court explained these holdings in Cornelius: "In
contrast to the general access policy in Widmar, school board policy
did not grant general access to the school mail system. The practice
was to require permission from the individual school principal before
access to the system to communicate with teachers was granted."' 6 In
Cornelius itself, the Court held the CFC charity drive was not a desig-
nated forum because "the Government's consistent policy has been to
limit participation in the CFC to 'appropriate' [nonpolitical] voluntary
agencies and to require agencies seeking admission to obtain permis-
sion from federal and local Campaign officials."'6'7
Like the situations in Perry Education and Cornelius, and unlike
the blanket permission policy adopted in Widmar, a trademark owner
can obtain registration only if she satisfies the criteria of § 2 in the
judgment of the PTO."6 Even assuming that trademark owners are "a
particular class of speakers" - rather than "individual speakers"-that
have exclusive access to the Register,' the individual members of that
class must obtain permission from the PTO in an individual fashion.
162 Forbes, 523 US at 679.
163 454 US 263 (1981).
164 Id at 267.
165 See Perry Education, 460 US at 47-48.
166 Cornelius, 473 US at 803.
167 Id at 804.
168 See 15 USC § 1052. See also note 23.
169 Trademark owners may be viewed to have exclusive access to the Register because one
cannot obtain registration without a trademark.
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The PTO acceptance is not ministerial because it involves a substan-
tive judgment by the examining attorney about the registrability of
the mark in light of the registration criteria of the Act."° This eligibility
determination system is more in line with "selective access" than a
"general access" scheme promoting "indiscriminate use." In the ab-
sence of other evidence of "purposeful" opening up of a forum, the
policy and the enforcement practice of the Act showcases the selective
access attributes of a nonpublic forum.
b) The forum and its compatibility with expressive activity.
i) Selectivity. In addition to the question of selectivity of
access, the Principal Register's "nature and compatibility with expres-
sive activity" are significant factors in determining its public forum
status." The Court has stated that "the government does not create a
public forum by ... permitting limited discourse"'' 2 or by "reserv[ing
its property] for other intended purposes, communicative or other-
wise."' 3 The government, "no less than a private owner of property, has
power to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it
is lawfully dedicated.' ' . In Greer v Spock,'" a case involving claims of
the right of access to a military base by political candidates, the Court
found that the government did not open up a limited public forum
when broad public access to its property would interfere with the mis-
sion of the institution. 6 Unlike Greer, the nature of the Principal Reg-
ister is not in itself "inconsistent with expressive activity."'' 7 The speech
element of trademarks fits the design of the Register well, and there
are no disciplinary, security, or similar considerations that render ex-
pressive activity on it problematic.
At the same time, however, the Principal Register is not like the
university facilities in Widmar, the primary purpose of which was to
foster exchange of ideas through "the intellectual give and take of
campus debate."'' 8 The Principal Register is hardly a forum for debate
about the relative merits of ideas, even though the expressive aspect
170 See 15 USC § 1052. See also note 23.
171 Lehman, 418 US at 302-03.
172 Cornelius, 473 US at 802.
173 Hazelwood School District v Kuhlmeier, 484 US 260,267 (1988).
174 Greer, 424 US at 836, quoting Adderley, 385 US at 47.
175 424 US 828 (1976).
176 See id at 837-40 ("[Tlhe business of a military installation ... [is] to train soldiers, not to
provide a public forum."). See also Adderley, 385 US at 39,47 (holding that the sheriff could lawful-
ly ban demonstrators from jail grounds because the area in question was "reserved for jail uses").
177 Cornelius, 473 US at 803.
178 Widmar, 454 US at 267-68 n 5, quoting Healy v James, 408 US 169, 180 (1972).
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of trademarks is an integral component of the material selected or
excluded. ' The stated objective of the Lanham Act is "the protection
of trade-marks, securing to the owner the goodwill of his business and
protecting the public against spurious and falsely marked goods.''..
The legislative purpose of the Act was therefore not to open the Reg-
ister up for an "intellectual give and take, '.8. but to "reserve the forum
for its intended purposes '' of promoting the goals of trademark law.
ii) Commercial enterprise. When the government uses its
property as a "commercial enterprise," the forum is likely to be cha-
racterized as nonpublic. The Court has emphasized that the fact that
the government was engaged in a "commercial enterprise" was indica-
tive of the government's intent not to open up its property to "the free
exchange of ideas."' In assessing whether an airport terminal was a
designated forum or a nonpublic forum, the Court observed in Lee
that "[a]s commercial enterprises, airports must provide services at-
tractive to the marketplace. In light of this, it cannot fairly be said that
an airport terminal has as a principal purpose promoting 'the free ex-
change of ideas.' '' .. Similarly, in Lehman, the fact that the city used the
space on the city transit system as a commercial venture was deter-
minative of its status as a nonpublic forum. The Court found that the
city must retain "discretion to develop and make reasonable choices
concerning the type of advertising that may be displayed in its ve-
hicles."1
Unlike the fora in Lee and Lehman, the Principal Register cannot
be described as a "commercial enterprise." The PTO does charge fees
for application for registration,'" but such a fee-collection regime can
hardly be viewed as a "commercial enterprise." It is, rather, a logistical
device to defray the costs of the administration of the registration
process. If one were to consider all fee collection to be commercial
ventures, the inevitable absurdity of this logic would be that collection
of fees for issuance of US passports" and Freedom of Information Act
179 See text accompanying notes 64-68.
180 HR Rep No 76-944 at 2 (cited in note 157).
181 Widmar, 454 US at 267-68 n 5.
182 Perry Education, 460 US at 46.
183 See Lee, 505 US at 682, quoting Cornelius, 473 US at 800; Lehman, 418 US at 303.
184 505 US at 682, quoting Cornelius, 473 US at 800.
185 Lehman, 418 US at 303.
186 See 15 USC § 1051.
187 See Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, Passport Fees (Feb 1, 2008), online
at http://travel.state.gov/passportlgetlfees/fees_837.html (visited June 8, 2008).
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(FOIA) requests88 would transform the Departments of State and
Justice respectively into "commercial enterprises." A more reasonable
interpretation of the Lee-Lehman "commercial enterprise" factor is
that the very nature of government activity must be commercial. Both
the advertising and airport operations had a distinct profit-making
character. That is not the case here. The trademark registration system
is not a commercial enterprise designed to turn profits. Rather, its
purpose is centered on protecting consumers and trademark owners.
The "commercial enterprise" factor, therefore, is absent from the Lan-
ham Act framework.
iii) The Principal Register is a nonpublic forum. The preced-
ing analysis demonstrates that the Principal Register is a nonpublic
forum. At first glance, the language, the legislative history, and the in-
terpretative practice of the Lanham Act by the courts seem to indicate
that the Principal Register was open for general access as a limited
forum. Yet a closer examination of the purpose of the Register and the
selectivity of the registration mechanism counsels strongly in favor of
the nonpublic forum status of the Register. The Court has made it
clear that "selective access, unsupported by evidence of a purposeful
designation for public use, does not create a public forum."'1 Because
such evidence is substantially lacking here, the Principal Register must
be a nonpublic forum.
Interest,.igly, this does not automatically determine the proper
standard of scrutiny applied to § 2(a). The case of the Principal Regis-
ter is unique in that it concerns commercial speech in a nonpublic fo-
rum. The Court's public forum jurisprudence thus far has concerned
core political speech. Therefore, to answer the question presented
here, one needs to understand what the operative test is when it is
commercial speech that is being regulated on government property.
IV. COMMERCIAL SPEECH IN A PUBLIC FORUM
The First Amendment canon has not explicitly addressed the
question of the proper test for reviewing restrictions on commercial
speech in the context of the public forum doctrine. Nearly all of the
Court's public forum cases involved political or religious speech en-
titled to the highest level of protection. What happens when it is
commercial speech-ordinarily protected by an intermediate level of
188 See Department of Justice, Freedom of Information Act Fees and Fee Waivers, online at
http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/04-1 2.html (visited June 8,2008).
189 Cornelius, 473 US at 805.
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scrutiny-that is being suppressed on government property? The
Court has not given a definitive answer.
A. When Commercial Speech and Public Forum Doctrines Intersect
Commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection,
albeit of limited measure. ' Regulations of commercial speech are sub-
ject to an intermediate level of scrutiny and are permissible only if
they satisfy the four-part test laid down in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corp v Public Service Commission of New York. 9' First, in
order for commercial speech to come within the orbit of the First
Amendment, it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Second, the regulation must be designed to pursue a substantial gov-
ernment interest. If the answers to the first two questions are positive,
then the regulation in question will survive scrutiny if it directly and
significantly advances the government interest.. and if it is no more1 93
extensive than necessary to serve that interest. On the other hand, as
discussed above, traditional and designated fora are subject to strict
scrutiny, while regulations in a nonpublic forum must be reasonable
and viewpoint-neutral. '
It is plain then that the commercial speech standard is distinct
from the public forum test. Central Hudson -with its requirement that
the government interest in restraining speech be substantial and that
the restraint be no more extensive than necessary- offers a less de-
manding test of the government's action than the traditional and des-
ignated public forum's requirements of a compelling government in-
terest and narrow tailoring of the regulation.", On the other hand, the
commercial speech standard is more protective of speech than the
nonpublic forum test, which only requires that the regulation be rea-
sonable and viewpoint neutral. '9 The question of which standard to
apply may therefore be crucial to the ultimate outcome. As the discus-
190 See Virginia Pharmacy Board v Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 US 748, 772
(1976) ("Although commercial speech enjoys First Amendment protection,... a different degree
of protection is necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial informa-
tion is unimpaired.").
191 447 US 557,564-66 (1980).
192 See id at 564. See also 44 Liquormart, Inc v Rhode Island, 517 US 484, 505 (1996)
(strengthening the Central Hudson test by requiring a state to show that a restriction advances
the state interest significantly).
193 See Central Hudson, 447 US at 565.
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sion will show, in the case of a nonpublic forum, the forum test of rea-
sonableness and viewpoint-neutrality should control.
Virtually all public forum cases the Court has decided have in-
volved political speech. The exceptions are City of Cincinnati v Dis-
covery Network, Inc"and Board of Trustees of SUNY v Fox,1" but both
cases failed to provide any guidance as to the right standard of review
of a regulation of commercial speech on government property. Dis-
covery Network involved a city ban on the distribution of commercial
handbills from news racks on public property. The publications in ques-
tion were commercial speech, and the news racks were located on city
streets, a traditional public forum. Mysteriously, however, the Court
did not even mention the public forum doctrine and proceeded to ap-
ply the commercial speech standard)9
In Fox, the Court had an opportunity to resolve the question but
explicitly declined to address it. Fox involved a resolution by a public
university to prohibit private commercial enterprises from operating
on its premises. The district court had applied the public forum analy-
sis and determined that the school dormitories did not constitute a
public forum. The court of appeals had applied the Central Hudson
test '1 The Court declined to address the underlying question of which
standard should apply and instead reversed the court of appeals on
the grounds that it misconceived the meaning of Central Hudson.
One might infer from this that in cases of commercial speech in a
public forum, the commercial standard controls. While that stance in
Fox and Discovery Network might be correct, to understand what the
197 507 US 410 (1993).
198 492 US 469 (1989).
199 See id at 416.
200 See 493 US at 473 n 2.
201 See id at 472-73.
202 See id at 477 (holding that the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test need not meet
the least-restrictive-means standard as suggested by the court of appeals). Lower courts have not
added much clarity either. Consider generally Sciarrino v City of Key West, 83 F3d 364, 366-67
(11th Cir 1996) (applying the commercial speech standard to the city ordinance banning adver-
tising canvassing in public locations without mentioning of the public forum doctrine); Lueth v
St. Clair County Community College, 732 F Supp 1410,1414-15 n 3 (ED Mich 1990) (finding that
the student newspaper was a public forum but holding, without any reference to authority, that
the public forum test "applies only to noncommercial speech"). For a discussion of the problem,
see generally Andi Chang, The Ninth Circuit's Exotic Dance with the Commercial Speech Doc-
trine, 1 Nev L J 226 (2001) (proposing that courts apply the standard of commercial speech);
Irena S. Ayers, What Rudy Hasn't Taken Credit for: First Amendment Limits on Regulation of
Advertising on Government Property, 42 Ariz L Rev 607 (2000) (identifying the confusion of the
courts in applying the public forum doctrine to commercial speech regulations).
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correct rule should be in all cases, the respective objectives of the pub-
lic forum and commercial speech doctrines should be considered.
The Court has justified the lower level of protection for commer-
cial speech because of its "objectivity" and greater "hardiness."' Ac-
cording to the Court, commercial speech is more objective because its
truth is "more easily verifiable" than that of political commentary or
news reporting.2 Commercial speech is also more durable because,
advertising being "the sine qua non of commercial profits, there is lit-
tle likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and foregone
entirely." 0' Furthermore, there are "commonsense differences" be-
tween commercial and political speech suggesting that the former is of
lower value to the First Amendment.
If such is the case, then indeed there is no reason to ratchet up
scrutiny of "low" value commercial speech to the "compelling inter-
est" test of traditional and designated fora merely because the speech
happens to occur on government property. If content-based restric-
tions on core speech are subject to strict scrutiny both in a (traditional
and designated) public forum and in the private sphere, then a similar
principle of symmetry dictates that the incidence of commercial
speech on public property should not change its low value status and
the reduced level of protection accorded it for that reason.
Conversely, when commercial speech is in a nonpublic forum, the
proper test should be the nonpublic forum requirements of reasona-
bleness and viewpoint-neutrality. Given the premise of the nonpublic
forum category-that as a proprietor, the government is afforded
greater latitude in regulating access to its own property-the govern-
ment's proprietary control should not be diminished by virtue of the
fact that "low value" speech seeks to enter it. If core political speech
cannot so diminish government's discretion, then certainly commercial
speech cannot accomplish more.
One might argue that because political speech in a nonpublic fo-
rum is protected only with a standard of reasonableness and view-
point-neutrality, the lower-value commercial speech should get even
less protection. This may be true as a matter of logic; but because
there has not been a case in the Court's forum jurisprudence when the
203 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 771-72 n 24. For a criticism of the Court's commercial
speech distinction, see generally Alex Kozinski and Stuart Banner, Who Is Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 Va L Rev 627 (1990).




The University of Chicago Law Review
majority found a regulation in a nonpublic forum to be unreasonable,
the reasonableness test already appears to lack much bite.m In that
light, anything less than the reasonableness test would effectively
amount to no protection for commercial speech at all, something that
the Court explicitly repudiated.
The distinct objectives of the two doctrines suggest that even in a
traditional forum, commercial speech does not raise the same con-
cerns that animate the heightened scrutiny of restrictions on core
speech in public fora. While the potential for government abuse of
power by exclusion of unpopular opinions or groups from public fora
justifies strict scrutiny, the Court's stated "objectivity" of commercial
speech reduces the need for such a level of protection. Similarly, while
the public forum doctrine is more concerned with ensuring that tradi-
tional avenues of communication are available to people who lack
access to other, costlier alternatives, the "hardiness" of commercial
speech is believed to guarantee its ability to survive restraints.
Consequently, in a traditional or designated public forum, gov-
ernment restrictions on commercial speech should be analyzed under
the Central Hudson four-part framework. When, however, commercial
speech is in a nonpublic forum, the nonpublic forum test of reasona-
bleness and viewpoint-neutrality should control. Because the Principal
Register is a nonpublic forum, the constitutionality of § 2(a) will thus
depend on whether it is a reasonable and viewpoint-neutral restraint
on speech.
B. A Task for the Courts
While exclusions from nonpublic fora are typically likely to be
upheld, the validity of § 2(a) is far from certain. The Court has stated
that "[t]he reasonableness of the Government's restriction of access to
a nonpublic forum must be assessed in light of the purpose of the fo-
rum and all the surrounding circumstances."1 ' It is fairly clear that the
prohibition on registration of "scandalous," "immoral," and "disparag-
ing" trademarks does not further the Lanham Act's objective of pro-
tecting the owner against infringement or the public against confusion.
Courts and commentators have suggested a number of government
interests that are served by § 2(a). The most commonly suggested ones
207 See Lee, 505 US at 690-92 (O'Connor concurring).
208 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 US at 770.
209 See Stone, 25 Wm & Mary L Rev at 219 n 111 (cited in note 109).
210 Cornelius, 473 US at 809. See also Perry Education, 460 US at 49.
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are preventing "scandalous," "immoral," and "disparaging" marks
from "1) carrying the imprimatur of the federal government, 2) receiv-
ing the support of public funds, 3) being the subject of exclusive own-
ership, 4) [ ] being encouraged through the trademark registration
scheme, and 5) interfering with the public's health and welfare. 211
Since these interests are not directly related to the purpose of the
Principal Register, presumably they fall under the rubric of "all the
surrounding circumstances" noted by the Court."' Subsequent com-
mentary has discussed these circumstances in detail and mostly re-
jected them as insufficient. "
Even if § 2(a) satisfies the "reasonableness" prong of the nonpublic
forum test, as discussed in Part II.B.4, the prohibition on registration of
"disparaging" marks is most likely a viewpoint-based restriction. View-
point discrimination is presumptively unconstitutional in any forum.1
At least in its "disparaging" prong, then, § 2(a) is likely unconstitutional.
CONCLUSION
As was stated from the outset, it is beyond the scope of this
Comment to assess the validity of § 2(a). It set up a framework for
properly analyzing the constitutionality of § 2(a)'s content-based ban.
Should a challenge to § 2(a) be mounted again, it should be examined
under the public forum doctrine. As a restriction on speech in a non-
public forum, it should be held to a standard of reasonableness and
viewpoint neutrality. There is considerable doubt that § 2(a) meets this
211 Baird, 83 Trademark Rep at 699 (cited in note 27). See also Cathryn L. Claussen, Ethnic
Names and Logos-Is There a Legal Solution?, 6 Marq Sports L J 409, 412 (1996) (suggesting a
government interest in preventing racial unrest); Davis, 54 Ohio St L J at 369-73 (cited in note
44) (noting that courts have upheld state interests in preventing obscenity, child pornography,
fighting words, and defamation).
212 See Cornelius, 473 US at 809; Lee, 505 US at 687 (O'Connor concurring) ("Considera-
tion of a forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the
significance of the governmental interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature
and function of the particular forum involved."). Commentators who have discussed these inter-
ests have done so not in the context of the public forum doctrine but within the framework of
the "substantial interest" portion of the Central Hudson test. See generally Claussen, 6 Marq
Sports L J 409 (cited in note 211); Davis, 54 Ohio St L J 331 (cited in note 44).
213 See, for example, Gibbons, 9 Marq Intel Prop L Rev at 233-36 (cited in note 44) (ar-
guing that all proffered justifications for § 2(a) "are merely attempts to cover militant prudery
with a fig leaf of legitimacy in the commercial context" and that "even if credible," they do not
save § 2(a) from unconstitutionality); Pace, 22 Pepperdine L Rev 7 at 40-43 (cited in note 61)
(dismissing the proposed government interests in avoiding the appearance of government ap-
proval, protecting the health and the welfare of the public, and preventing the expenditure of
public funds on offensive marks as insufficient and unsubstantiated).
214 See Part III.A.
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test, but to determine that, it is important to start with a proper frame-
work of analysis. The hope is that this and other commentary examin-
ing possible government interests in excluding scandalous and dispa-
raging matter from the Principal Register will assist the courts in car-
rying out that task.
